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Abstract: This article examines processes by which development project 
implementations afford the state the appearance of being a separate structure. By 
exploring the implementation of an important state development project in North-
western Ethiopia, the Koga Irrigation and Watershed Management (KIWM) scheme, it 
shows why and how the project plan does not correspond to the real life of the scheme. 
The article unpacks assumptions that policymakers and development practitioners make 
about the a priori existence of a community and state distinction, and the ways in 
which they arrange them as functionally differentiated entities. It also shows how the 
project’s community-driven participatory approach, wherein local people were involved 
in managing the scheme, produces the effect of ghettoising practices of abuse as 
community issues. The article contributes to recent ethnographic studies of state-society 
relations and contends that these studies could gain important insights by exploring 
development project implementation practices as an entry point into the study of the 
processes that give the state the appearance of a material reality. 
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Introduction  
The Weberian assumption that the state as a discrete entity could be studied apart from 
society has been challenged from anthropological and Foucauldian perspectives which 
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document the everyday ways in which the state is deeply embedded in the wider social 
formation.1 In Ethiopian context, several scholars have demonstrated the complex overlap 
between traditional values and formal institutions,2 the interface nature of party-state-peasant 
relations3 and how state-society relations are characterised by a complex interplay of power 
and authority.4 Taking this further, they point towards the theoretical and empirical difficulty 
of studying the state as an entity distinct from society.  
While all of that is certainly true, it is also worth appreciating that the analytical 
distinction between state and society provides an especially illuminating vantage point to 
understand the split between the ways in which development practitioners and bureaucrats 
involved with development project implementations conceptualise the state and the ways in 
which it works on the ground.5 A rich research tradition of anthropological research provides 
an invaluable account of the ways in which various modes of practices constitute the state as 
a seemingly coherent, dominant and unified entity, separate from and suspended over and 
above society. 6 Mitchell 7 describes this phenomenon of reification as ‘structural effects’, 
whereby the ‘state’ is not an actual structure, but ‘the powerful, metaphysical effect of 
practices that make such structures appear’.8 
I suggest that development – both as a discourse and practice –provides an example of 
how this process is playing out in Ethiopia. Over the past two decades, the Ethiopian state has 
increasingly tied its legitimacy to rapid economic growth and poverty reduction efforts.9 The 
government, along with its international development partners, has launched an extraordinary 
range of development programmes, including the promotion of basic services, irrigation 
projects, group-based participatory programmes (such as the Productive Safety Net) and 
cooperative schemes.10 In this article, I use the current practices associated with development 
project implementation as a lens to understand the processes ‘through which the uncertain yet 
powerful distinction between state and society is produced’.11  
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The development project in question is the Koga Irrigation and Watershed Management 
(KIWM) project, an important local development scheme in North-western Ethiopia.12 This 
scheme is an interesting case study because throughout the sequential phases in its 
development (design, training, construction and implementation) local and high-level state 
functionaries are engaged in activities that differentiate state from society. In examining this 
project across these stages, the article offers an ethnographic understanding of statecraft, 
rooted in the ‘contingent, contradictory’13 and iterative processes and practices14 that help to 
constitute the porous boundaries between state and society. In so doing, it aims to establish 
three interrelated points. First, state-implemented development and empowerment 
programmes create the appearance of a distinction between the state and society. However, 
this distinction is not a product of lower-level politics, but rather reflects the constitutive 
effects of central state strategies of development and attempts of their enactments by locally 
situated actors (lower-level state agents). These boundaries in practice are also permeable and 
constantly in flux.  
Second, the technocratic logic of the scheme re/constitutes subject dispositions of the poor 
and women by articulating gendered and classist discourses pertaining to their capacity to 
participate in the project. I will show that the scheme works by creating subject positions that 
reproduce existing power relations and inequalities. This does not however mean that the 
women and poor people I interviewed are merely passive victims of development practices 
and lacking in agency. In fact, they do engage with constraints and opportunities actively on a 
daily basis. This includes recourse to ‘twilight institutions’ 15  such as social courts that 
straddle the supposedly reified realms of state and society. However, the degree of their 
agency should not be over-stated. Instead of seeing the activities of the poor and women as a 
form of local resistance against domination by development projects16, I demonstrate the 
ambivalent and contradictory ways in which they at once accommodate and negotiate classist 
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and gendered power relations around them. In so doing I reveal the complexities and 
contradictions of local agency 17  with respect to processes of state formation and 
development.18 
Third, I argue that the boundary, although ambiguous, has very real, material, 
consequences. In so doing, I point to what James Ferguson calls an ‘instrument-effect’ of 
development – side effects unintended by planners such as the expansion of bureaucratic state 
power and ‘ideological effect of depoliticizing both poverty and the state’19. My ethnographic 
descriptions of the effects of the KIWM broadly echo Ferguson’s observations about the 
depoliticising effects20 of development practices. However, the process by which the state-
society boundary is produced not only work to depoliticise inequality, prevent meaningful 
participation and reproduce power hierarchies, but they also ghettoise abuses and resource 
conflicts by presenting them as community issues rather than those of the state. Given this 
reality, I argue that decontextualised understanding of state society relations in development 
planning and implementation can obscure class and gender inequalities.  
The article draws on ethnographic fieldwork carried out in the small rural kebele21 of 
Degga, located in west Gojjam Zones of Amhara National Regional State, North-western 
Ethiopia. Methodologically, it involves the institutional study of practices, documentary 
analysis of project texts,22  and ‘thick description’23 of project management and everyday 
interactions at the interface24 between state functionaries and local people. Data collection 
entailed a range of different ethnographic techniques such as in-depth 
interviews/conversations and direct and participant observations. I met, conversed with and 
interviewed more than 70 informants, including farmers, government agents and 




The article first introduces the technocratic logic framing the planning of the scheme. 
Second it demonstrates how the institutional setting of the scheme reflected the pre-existing 
top-down hierarchical state bureaucratic set-up, thereby effectively excluding the local 
population from all decision-making bodies. Third,   it analyses how training programmes 
devised by different government departments are anchored in a problematic divide between 
tradition and modernity. The fourth and fifth sections examine the effects and material 
consequences of the appearance of state-society distinction in the lives of local people. The 
concluding section draws out the article’s wider relevance for understanding state-society 
relations and development project planning. 
The KIWM scheme: the logic of the project  
The KIWM scheme is a central agricultural development project which aims to ‘contribute 
towards poverty reduction among smallholders through improvement in food security in the 
Region [Amhara regional state] in particular and the country as a whole … [and] to improve 
agricultural production in the catchment and command areas of the Koga River valley in a 
sustainable manner’.25 Construction began in 2001 and was completed in 2011 after four 
years of delay. The scheme draws water from the Koga River – one of the 50 tributaries of 
the upper Blue Nile (locally known as Abay) and irrigates a total land area of 7000 ha across 
nine kebeles, covering 12 blocks and 11 reservoirs. It enables farmers who are limited to rain-
fed cropping to produce crops and vegetables during the dry season. The number of 
beneficiaries at the time of my fieldwork in Degga stood at 942 households.26  
The scheme was designed and implemented under the aegis of the Ministry of Water, 
Irrigation and Energy (MoWIE) and was funded by the African Development Bank (AfDB). 
The scheme’s most important feature was the emphasis placed on the participation of farmers 
and their active involvement at all stages of project implementation, planning, design and 
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construction. The logic was threefold.  First, both the Ethiopian government and donor 
agency saw participation as a mechanism to overcome the legacy of public mistrust 
bequeathed by previous authoritarian projects (e.g. collective farming and villagisation).27 
The new paradigm was therefore supposed to represent a new form of governance based on 
the active involvement of the local population, with a view to promoting partnerships 
between the local population and the state in order to realise the ultimate objectives of 
agricultural transformation and poverty reduction. The fecundity of linking state and society 
is reflected in the shift in emphasis from a top-down approach to a ‘decentralised and 
participatory-based project implementation’ and ‘bottom-up mechanism of accountability’.28 
Secondly, the concern and objective of participation is driven, largely as part of donor 
conditionality, by the desire to build local capacity, ‘a sense of ownership’ and ‘community 
self-management capacity’29,  in order to cede state management and control so that the 
project would  ultimately be sustained solely by community effort. This is supposed to be 
accomplished by transforming the local population (community), which is presumed to be 
characterised by horizontal social networks as opposed to the verticality that the state 
represents, into a WUA that acts to manage its own development and address collective 
problems.30  The scheme in official circles is considered a ‘landmark’31, ‘the first of its kind 
in Ethiopia’ and ‘unique’ 32 , in that it underscores the dialectical relationship between 
farmers’ empowerment and poverty reduction: empowerment through participation was seen 
as a means for poverty reduction, and poverty reduction, in turn, was conceived to be a 
necessary tool with which to encourage participation and collective responsibility for 
community self-development.33  
Finally, in Degga, as elsewhere in Ethiopia, participation cannot be understood without 
reference to the revolutionary democracy ideology of the ruling coalition, the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s (EPRDF). The EPRDF uses participation as a 
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means to mobilise community resources (financial, human and material) and also to 
implement plans designed by highly placed actors within the party and state apparatus.34 In 
this respect, state/party-organised groups called lematawi buden35 (development teams) were 
actively engaged in project activities, contributing their time and labour for the project 
construction and maintenance.36 For project planners37, development team involvement is 
desirable to mobilise resources such as free labour that would otherwise not be possible to 
capitalise on. Meanwhile, by emphasising the role of development teams, the party is able to 
present the scheme as public as opposed to state driven, and hence legitimate. This is a 
crucial aspect of processes that produce the state as something separate from society.  
However, this coevalness of the project’s technocratic formulation with the instrumentalist 
form of participation under EPRDF ideology should be seen as the result of the permeability 
of the boundary between party and state, and between state and society realms. In practice, 
the boundaries between state institutions (such as the kebele), and political party are blurred; 
there is no state empirically distinct from EPRDF party structure in Degga or a state discrete 
from society. The kebele is a politically and institutionally dynamic site, where people, party 
politics and institutions often interpenetrate. Decentralised government and bureaucratic 
structures coexist with ‘twilight institutions’ 38  such as social courts and cooperatives. 
Moreover, the kebele administration in Degga is dominated by EPRDF members called 
model farmers – a class of largely semi-educated, local notables who maintain relatively 
significant land holdings and wealth. They are chosen, according to the woreda 39 
administrator, for their ‘leadership qualities, progressive and developmental outlook’ and for 
their ‘self-made wealth’.40 These actors are also located within agricultural, micro-finance 
and water cooperatives. Many of my informants thought model farmers were the first to 
exploit state resources such as improved varieties of seeds and chemical fertilisers and to take 
advantage of modern irrigation technologies and wheat procurement schemes. This has 
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brought about increased agricultural yields, a higher rate of return from farming, enabling 
them to accumulate further wealth and consolidate their social prestige and political 
influence. The formulation of KIWM fails to recognise these overlapping institutional 
dynamics and the complexity of the power relations on the ground that prefigured the project. 
It is in this sense that it becomes important to note the slippage between project plans and 
eventual outcomes concerning participation and empowerment.  
Overall, the scheme’s logic of participation reveals two facets of boundary-making 
between state and society. First, in framing the participatory agenda of the project, the 
MoWIE sought to establish a strong partnership between the state and society. However, the 
very idea of such a partnership presupposes that the state and the local population are 
mutually exclusive objects. Although the ministry’s aim was to break down the seeming 
boundary between state and society, it has actually re/produced the boundary and reified the 
two as independently existing entities. 
Second, the whole idea of community participation and community-based organisation is 
premised on the assumption of the existence of ‘community-as-social organisation’,41 that is, 
separate from the state. The concept of community (mahbereseb) is abstract, ambiguous and, 
more to the point, was never before part of the everyday vernacular in Degga. Instead it was 
previously used to constitute the ideological basis of the Derg regime, i.e. socialism, and was 
employed at the local level as a label for state-orchestrated meetings and work groups. With 
the ousting of the Derg, the concept again resurfaced but this time in the context of a 
participatory development approach. In Degga, it has been widely put to use throughout state-
orchestrated awareness campaigns, capacity building programmes and in the process of the 
formation of the WUA and cooperative groups. Conversely, in everyday life, people use 
different/various or a plurality terms to refer to a wide range of social relationships. For 
example, the concept of got (parish) or debere (population settled around one church) are 
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used to refer to socio-spatial units, and the terms mahber (religious feasts), idir (burial 
societies), iqub (informal saving schemes) and wonfel (neighbourhood labour self-help 
groups) to describe social organisations, whereas the concept of hezeb (population or people) 
or hezebe-christian (Christian people or community) 42  have been employed as abstract 
categories to describe the whole local population.43 The concept of population or Christian 
community is used to describe an abstract entity of social relations with common values, but 
it does not necessarily describe territorial space.  
The key point here is that ideas of belonging to a secular and geographically localised 
empirical group called community, in which local people act harmoniously and collectively, 
represented by common public authority, and enjoy the benefits of community-wide 
relationships of solidarity or possess a representative promoting collective goals to the state, 
do not exist. Community, in other words, is not an organising social unit. Rather, local social 
life, as seen above, is dominated by wide and dispersed networks of associational 
relationships. The point here is not that local residents lack a sense of shared identity. On the 
contrary. People identify themselves as Amhara, which colloquially means Orthodox 
Christian. The point here is rather that community is not an ‘already existing’ empirical group 
that exists separate from society. Community is a product of an exclusionary (boundary-
making) logic of state practices. This is clearly reflected in my informants’ responses to my 
question asking what community is: ‘ye kebele tesatfo’44 (participating in kebele activities), 
‘does it mean people?’45, ‘It means people’,46 ‘I think it is when we gathered together for 
kebele meetings’, 47  ‘… when we come to work together in the kebele or irrigation’. 48 
Particularly interesting here is that the concept of ‘community’ was understood in relation to 
activities in and around kebele meetings or only in opposition to the state.  
The above discussion illustrates how the notion of community is reproduced simply to 
conform to the national policy agenda of participation and self-management. More 
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specifically, it is juxtaposed in relation to the state, as a counter to ‘past experience [of] … 
large-scale rural development projects in Ethiopia [which] have tended to be driven by 
government and [whose] acceptance has been low’.49  
Institutional setting  
After the project design, the construction required the establishment of an institutional 
structure to facilitate local participation.  Here, the overall bottom-up approach of project 
construction and implementation, as noted above, meant that the local population were 
supposed to be included in institutional decision-making bodies and participate at every stage 
of the project construction and, in the process, hold government officials to account. 
However, to do so, in the eyes of the government, they needed to be sufficiently trained and 
empowered; which gave rise to a top-down panoply of professional and bureaucratic 
expertise, acting upon a series of hierarchically structured committees, all concerned with 
downward supervision to the point where it reaches the kebele and then the local population. 
Within this structure, rather than as partners of the state, the local population were engaged as 
end-users – exteriors of the state. This is demonstrated in the account below, which describes 
the organisational structure of those institutions that make up the state apparatus and were 
involved in the planning and implementation of the scheme.  
At the federal level, the controlling agency of the scheme is the MoWIE, located in Addis 
Ababa. The MoWIE oversees all project activities, devises guidelines, manages project funds, 
communicates with the donor organisation, the construction contractor and other federal 
government departments and ensures the project runs conterminous with the larger state 
policy frameworks. Below the federal level, the scheme was supervised by a regional Project 
Steering Committee (PSC) located in the regional capital city, Bahir Dar. The PSC members 
were drawn from the Amhara Bureau of Water Resources, the Amhara Bureau of 
Agricultural and Rural Development, the Amhara Region Environmental Protection, Land 
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Use and Administration Authority, and the Regional Women’s Office and the Amhara 
Region Cooperatives Promotion Bureau. The steering committee prepares and provides 
training for the local population on a range of issues such as gender equality, agricultural 
productivity and ethics of work.50  
At the kebele level, the scheme was coordinated by a project management unit (PMU) 
committee, whose members include a project manager, who is a politician from the woreda51 
administration, an agriculturalist, gender coordinator, representative from the woreda 
Agriculture Bureau, representatives from the nine kebele administrations, a procurement 
officer, an accountant, and a monitoring and evaluation officer. The project unit members 
help to mobilise the local population for labour, facilitate and arrange meetings and training 
sessions, and provide day-to-day construction supervision. They also arrange compensation 
payment for lost livelihoods at the project site.52  
Farmers, on the other hand, are placed within the lower ranks of the development ladder 
and outside the state hierarchical bounds. The formal decision-making structure does not 
involve either the democratic representation of farmers or any broad-based community 
participation forum. Instead, the kebele chairman was appointed to represent the local 
population and ensure that community priorities were included in important decisions. This 
means that, in contrast to the large number of hierarchically placed professional and 
bureaucratic state functionaries, the local population approached the scheme with the service 
of kebele politicians. Consequently, the progressive participatory approach that appears and 
aims, at least in theory, to create a real possibility of active participation, but turns out in fact, 
to reify the old top-down paternalist approach which counter-poses state and society as 
distinct categories, by hierarchically ordering them. One thus notes a ‘path-dependent 
effect’,53 a condition where the organisation of the everyday operation of the scheme simply 
reflects the pre-existing bureaucratic hierarchical set-up. In other words, although the project 
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was supposed to operate in a bottom-up participatory-based fashion through active farmer 
participation, the sheer scale and hierarchical nature of the state system obliges the 
government to rely on a top-down bureaucratic approach. Ultimately, the state has figured as 
a bureaucratically authoritative, pyramidally structured organisation and as an entity that 
classifies the local population as exterior ‘outsiders’ who have to be mobilised, informed and 
represented by kebele leaders and as far as possible included into the party structures. 
The logic of capacity building: the modern state and traditional society  
The benefits of the Koga irrigation scheme were articulated by the scheme’s architects not 
solely in economic terms but also in terms of the social and cultural transformations that it 
was envisaged would eliminate the underlying social evils of poverty, such as a lack of work 
discipline. This agenda was numerous training programmes for various sections of the local 
population – women, the poor and model farmers – between 2002 and 2011.54  
The project planners55 believed that the local cultural and religious belief system posed an 
obstacle to the proper implementation of the irrigation scheme and prevented the local 
population from improving their own livelihoods. Most government publications challenge 
people’s religious beliefs, lack of discipline and anti-social and anti-progressive attitudes that 
are described as regressive attributes that undermine development efforts. A training manual 
entitled ‘Koga irrigation: development and social constraints’ described the local ‘work 
culture’ as a ‘lamentable obstacle to the economic and social progress of farmers’. It further 
holds that ‘it is an exercise in futility to hope for national progress with the current mind-
set’.56 It was claimed that ‘proper implementation of community self-management requires 
fundamental shifts in the norms and attitude of the farmers. The goal is to build social 
capability for using and sustaining the irrigation on a long-term basis.’ The project therefore 




What does this pedagogical modernisation model of development tell us about the state 
discourse of boundary work? In designing the training, different government departments 
positioned the state as a site of rationality and science and the local population as traditional, 
stagnant and work-shy, and, in doing so, they helped to re/produce a line of difference 
between state and society. In other words, on one level, characterisations such as ‘traditional’ 
assert both the superiority and autonomy of the state; on another level, they construct the 
local population not only as a separate non-state domain but also as temporally belonging to 
habits of the past. The result is that poverty and underdevelopment are ascribed more to 
tradition than to the current structure of inequality (especially in terms of access to resources) 
that led to growing wealth for the few. Significantly, this threatens the visibility of local class 
relations and the marginalisation of the poor by projecting them as victims of tradition.  
Additionally, the content of the training programmes was framed around the idea that state 
and society are inhabited by two fundamentally different kinds of people. On the one hand 
were the small group of people who were considered to be committed to the ideals of 
progress, rationality, science and technology. On the other hand were the majority of the 
population who were regarded as irrational, superstitious and traditional. In practice, 
however, state functionaries can hardly be characterised as ‘modern’ and ‘rational’, and they 
cannot be neatly juxtaposed against the local population. Instead, the identity and interaction 
between state functionaries and the local population are inextricably shaped and marked by 
common normative religious and social values. In other words, traditional social and cultural 
values animate as much the lifeworld of state functionaries as they influence the everyday 
lives of the local population. For example, during the course of my fieldwork, some civil 
servants at both the kebele and woreda levels had a high rate of absenteeism on unofficial 
public holidays.  
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On the other hand, most of the farmers were enthusiastic about and keen to take advantage 
of new agricultural technologies such as chemical fertilisers and hybrid varieties of seeds. 
The crux of the matter is that shared normative cultural practices interpellate both state 
functionaries and the local population in their daily lives and hence produce subjects who 
perform roles that cannot be neatly categorised as either modern or traditional. Therefore, 
tradition as a distinct domain that belongs to society is a context created by political actors 
and technocrats which quite fundamentally illustrates the statist practice of boundary-making. 
Institutionalisation of the state-society boundary: the WUA  
In addition to providing capacity building training, the MoWIR and AfDB determined that 
the legitimacy and sustainability of the project required the formation of a farmer-driven 
participatory institution that would articulate ‘community interests’ 58  and serve as an 
intermediary between the local people and the local institutions that constitute the state.59  
To this effect, in 2011, water cooperatives (WUAs) were established across the nine 
kebeles served by the irrigation system and federated to form one Koga Irrigation 
Cooperative.60 Here, the practice of producing and institutionalising the distinction between 
state and society finds its expression in a WUA by-law, which was prepared by the Amhara 
Regional Bureau of Cooperatives Promotion. The first element that the by-law established 
was distinctive state and non-state realms of authority. This involves division of 
responsibilities between the local institutions that make up the state apparatus and the local 
community/WUA. The by-law, for instance, states that a Project Operation Unit (POU), as a 
branch of government bureaucracy, operates ‘the dam and reservoir, main and secondary 
canals and drains and the associated road network’, whereas the WUA is responsible for the 
‘O&M [Operations and Maintenance] of the tertiary and quaternary canals and drains and 
associated access roads and on-farm structures’.61 Furthermore, the WUA is charged with the 
optimal allocation and utilisation of the water resource, generating local resources in cash or 
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labour for maintenance and operations, preventing erosion, ensuring the interests of the 
owners and users of the land plots and sanctioning violations of the rules.62 Thus, the local 
population were designated as exteriors to the state and treated as discrete development 
actors. The WUA, in this sense, represents the institutionalisation of the two schemas, the 
state and the local community, governed by a by-law which dictates specific rules, 
regulations and parameters on how the two are supposed to relate to one another.  
The second element introduced with the by-law was that the WUA, as a self-managed 
development actor, was to be run by a committee of seven community representatives who 
were to be elected as its members. The by-law, however, recommends that the leadership 
committee is composed of respected village elders, preferably those who can read and 
write. 63 The problem here was that the requirement for literacy and social status helped 
erstwhile dominant semi-educated social and political elites (model farmers) to continue their 
domination. At the time of my fieldwork, the leaders of the WUA in Degga were the same 
few elites who occupied multiple positions at various levels of the kebele administration. The 
chairman of the association was, for instance, the Degga kebele’s Amhara Democratic Party 
(ADP)/EPRDF head. It is clear then that the formation of the WUA – as a discrete 
community body separate from the kebele institution – has not affected local power relations. 
Rather, by distinguishing the elite from ordinary inhabitants, it reproduces and reinforces 
local stratifications, hierarchies and thereby perpetuates erstwhile power relations. As such, 
the boundary between the state and the local population, as we shall see later, simply serves 
as a resource of power and personal enrichment for those local elites on both sides of the 
dichotomy.  
Participation and subject sensibilities  
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This section examines how state training programmes induce farmers to identify themselves 
as ‘underdeveloped subjects’ 64  in order to demonstrate the contradictory effects of 
development and boundary-making practices. It does so by paying close attention to the ways 
in which training programmes and development discourses intended to encourage 
participation in fact informed the poor of their inferior position vis-à-vis (semi-)educated 
members of the local population.  
The grassroots’ vernacular understanding of the concept of participation has roots in the 
verb ‘to participate’, i.e. mesatef, which means to attend events, meetings or public works, 
etc. Participation, to the local population, therefore, simply implies attending meetings to 
receive information and listen to the eloquent and witty speeches and technical and forceful 
words given by state functionaries and public leaders. Many of my informants were surprised 
when I informed them that the project’s official view on participation65 entails the idea that 
participants are in charge of discourses, that they have the right to vote and be elected and 
that all local inhabitants should have an equal voice in decision-making processes. They 
would then be confounded by any difference this might make. ‘Regardless, it is not our place. 
A farmer toils with dirt and dust. We are not people of paper and pen’66 said a middle-aged 
farmer. Similarly, another middle-aged farmer expressed: ‘We [ordinary farmers] must accept 
whatever comes. A donkey and a farmer should consent to take orders.’67 Another elderly 
man said, ‘Who would listen to a farmer? We are looked down upon by everyone.’68 It is 
tempting to interpret these responses as a reflection of the dynamics of the Ethiopian 
authoritarian political tradition and the culture of obeisance to authority.69 Such an approach, 
however, fails to account for the ongoing complex contemporary practices that re/produce 
structural positions and the norms governing the participation of the local people in decision 
making processes.  
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Despite the scheme’s founding aim of transforming local inhabitants into empowered 
subjects, norms governing the participation of local people are animated by a constantly 
re/produced set of discourses and governance practices that constitute social classes and 
underdeveloped subjects . In particular, development and participation discourses were used 
by local inhabitants as points of reference against which they constituted not only ideas of 
state but also ‘underdeveloped’ subjectivities. State capacity building programmes, as seen in 
the first section, set the terms by which – and are key mediums through which – subject 
positions are managed. Many of the people I interacted with expressed that it is impossible to 
be active participants because, as one middle-aged farmer expressed, ‘participation requires 
the ability to read and write’ and he is an ‘uneducated peasant’.70 Here, an awareness of his 
illiteracy not only tells my informant that he cannot actively participate but also informs his 
sense of self as an ‘uneducated peasant’ and certainly positions him as such in the context of 
wider power relations. When asked to account for their lack of active participation, the 
majority of my informants drew on state discourses and described themselves using 
disparaging terms. One man remarked, ‘I cannot meaningfully participate because I am 
illiterate. We were told that working in the association [WUA] requires the ability to read and 
write. I have nothing useful to contribute to the WUA.’71 Many of the ordinary farmers were 
conscious of and sensitive to the structural and social contexts within which participation is 
required. One middle-aged farmer told me, ‘It was made clear to us during the training 
programmes the WUA needs educated people as leaders’. He further added, ‘I am not useful 
for them. My role is to learn what mengist72 teaches me … I have no one to blame but 
myself’73 Similarly, another middle-aged man said, ‘participation is best achieved only when 
educated people take the responsibility of leadership … As to the illiterate farmers … what 
we learn at meetings [training programmes] is sometimes difficult to comprehend. Only those 
who read and write can communicate better with mengist … poor people attend just to make 
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up the quorum.’74 These comments illustrate that in the context of active participation, the 
training programmes and subsequent elections of WUA leaders privileged literacy and 
devalued the agency of those who did not read and write.  
Despite the purpose behind the training programmes being to empower farmers, they 
were, as the comments above demonstrate, unwittingly grounded in radical self-
consciousness-raising projects, i.e. telling peasants what they are and do not have instead of 
how they can be. What farmers see is that they lack access, power and education and thereby 
any meaningful position in the participatory community management programme. By 
inculcating and pointing out the state-specified terms within which participation takes place, 
my informants constructed subordinated subjectivities. 
With respect to the local leadership, many of my informants compared their lives with 
those who were educated, powerful and wealthy, often belittling themselves in the process. 
They considered themselves as ‘lacking in education’75 and ‘knowledge of mengist’76 that 
defined local elites. In most cases, people’s endorsement of WUA representatives relates to 
the state’s emphasis on education and denigration of their agency which informs their sense 
of self, rather than local leaders’ ability to deliver economic and social benefits. In other 
words, individuals’ self-awareness of their situated constraints allows them to visualise and 
imagine how community participation is expected to work and who is well positioned to fit 
the expectations. Yet this does not mean that peasants accept all abuse of power and 
resources. They in fact try to contest or negotiate the abuse of power by semi-literate 
community representatives and state functionaries through institutions such as social courts.  
Indeed, in the view of my informants, the notion of participation, in the context of 
attending meetings, is significant. Most spoke positively about the information and 
knowledge they derived from the training programmes. They also embrace the ‘modernist’ 
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hope generated by state discourses. Almost all the illiterate people I spoke to were keen to 
send their children to school and prevent them from meeting the same fate. But they were 
also convinced that they cannot do anything about their illiteracy and material constraints. ‘I 
have received so many great ideas from the project people about how to use irrigation water 
and start an animal fattening business. But I am poor. I have no resources to put the 
information I gathered into practice,’ explained a middle-aged farmer.77 Similarly, another 
middle-aged man said, ‘I have learned so many things ... what and when to plan, soil erosion, 
water and fertiliser use, etc. But, I don’t have what the rich people have … land, fertiliser and 
money. Learning is good for nothing: I still struggle to feed my family.’78 Another man 
stated: ‘They teach us zemen ametash [modern] methods … but I have not seen training 
resulting in any benefit for the poor. They are good for the rich.’79 In short, knowledge of 
farming technology and methods which underpin capacity building discourses only served to 
create ‘underdeveloped as a subject and underdevelopment as a form of identity’80.  
Utilisation and management of the irrigation facility  
By 2011, construction activities had been completed and the farmers began to utilise the 
system for production in the dry season. In the meantime, management of the canal system 
was handed over to the WUA. The division between management responsibilities between 
the local state institutions and the local community/WUA brings into sharp focus the 
distinction between state and society by defining who and what constitute such domains and 
by making legible the agencies and individuals who perform roles that are recognised as 
either state or community. This process has helped to make a boundary between state and 
society appears as an empirical reality in the eyes of both the state functionaries and the local 
population. As I will demonstrate below, this ‘state effect’ 81  has been practically 
consequential in that it established an institutionalised relationship between the local 
institutions that make up the state apparatus and the local population based on the principles 
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of community self-management and limited state involvement, thereby exposing women and 
poor people to asymmetrical gender and class-based community relations that undermined 
their access to water and other resources. The effort to build community self-empowerment 
by treating the local population as discrete development actors separate from the state has 
therefore had the contradictory effect of perpetuating class and gender divisions. 
  To begin with I explore the local patterns of irrigation water and land use and market 
constraints in place ever since farmers began to utilise the irrigation system.82 In Degga, the 
lowest, most fertile and best-irrigated parts on the banks of the canals are cultivated by the 
rich and powerful. If the wealthy did not already own the land near the canals before they 
were built, they soon acquired it through long-term rent contracts or exchanges of land. The 
regional law permits land rent-outs by smallholders for up to 10 years for annual crops and 
for a maximum of 30 years for permanent fruit plants or preferred tree types.83 Particularly, 
during the first few years in which farmers began irrigating their land, market constraints 
allowed local elites and wealthy urban opportunists to rent land from poor, cash-strapped 
farmers. In 2011, for instance, with almost all of the farmers producing similar vegetables 
and crops such as tomatoes and onions and marketing during the same period of time, there 
was excess supply in the market. This resulted in a sharp fall in price. The tomato surplus 
especially could not be stored because of a lack of cold storage rooms. Urban-based traders 
made matters worse by quoting lower prices on tomatoes, forcing farmers to sell at a price as 
low as 10 ETB (£0.33) per quintal. Widowed women and poor farmers ended up renting out 
their plots to wealthy farmers and outsiders and becoming household and commercial farm 
labourers.84  
Over the following years, cognisant of market constraints, the government established the 
Amhara Seed Enterprise to contract farmers to grow commercial quantities of onion and 
wheat seeds at government procurement prices, way above the market value.85 At the local 
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level, the contracting process was primarily managed through the WUA and development 
agents (DAs), who are under the influence of local kebele cadres that straddle the line 
between the state and community. The result was that the work was almost entirely 
contracted out to wealthier farmers.86 Poor farmers are thus forced to rely on fast-yielding 
vegetables and tomatoes, thereby sharply reducing the demand for chemical fertiliser. 
However, the vegetable and tomato markets are too variable to secure an income.  
This situation is exacerbated by institutional restrictions. As the community, i.e. the WUA, 
is separate from public institutions, state actors are not able to interfere in the day-to-day 
monitoring of water distribution and management of disputes. At the same time, local elites 
(model farmers) dominate the leadership positions in the WUA. In order to keep their vast 
areas of land under cultivation, wealthy and powerful farmers use a great deal of water, 
reducing and sometimes denying water allocated to the poor. Community rights to water 
access are simply overridden by the growing quantity of crops produced commercially for the 
government by model farmers. As a result, I encountered persistent and extensive local 
complaints about exclusion from water distribution and the absence of any state help. One 
farmer explained his experience with his wealthier neighbour:  
He blocks the water to my field and diverts it to his own fields. I needed water 
desperately because tomato and vegetables [that he cultivated] need regular watering. 
He says that I only need little water because I have small plot … and sometimes he 
denies my turn … It is WUA’s responsibility. Mengist cannot help me.87  
Some have even given up farming during the dry season. One middle-aged farmer, for 
instance, reflected on his experience as follows: 
I have completely quit farming in dry seasons. It is costly … it needs land preparation, 
pesticide and regular watering … You have to fight with the rich to secure your right to 
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access water …. It is an association’s [WUA] thing, mengist can’t help you … 
ultimately, either your crops perish for lack of water or the market plummets and you 
end up selling them at a cheaper price that does not even cover your inputs and labour 
costs.88 
Because of the multiple constraints, many household heads, especially women, entered into 
sharecropping arrangements with wealthier farmers:  
It is easier for [widowed] women to enter into sharecropping. Farming is a man’s job. I 
am not capable of negotiation like a man to acquire fertiliser: I am weak to participate 
in maintenance work, and my children are very young. Added to that, there is no 
support [for widows] from the government with respect to water use or fertiliser. 
Everything is decided by the rich people in the cooperative [WUA]; there is not 
government involvement at all.89  
Experiences of abuse also surfaced in local complaints. A middle-aged farmer pointed out his 
own experience as a case in point:  
I have suffered the worst abuse … I had a problem with a rich man who has a big farm 
at the head. He used to block water and refuse to give me my turn. I reported it to the 
association [WUA], but they have done nothing. Then I reported it to a government 
person at the project office, and he told me it is ‘the association’s issue; they will deal 
with it’. Left with no other option, I decided to confront him. He sent his labourers to 
beat me. I reported it to the militia and the social court and they have done nothing. I 
then took the case to an elder, and the elder reprimanded his brutality towards me. I 
don’t know if it lasts but, for now, he respects my turn.90  
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Notable from this case is how, in the struggle over access to water, the realms of state and 
society have been restricted by the parameters of institutions and the law and negotiating 
points have been narrowed down to internal village social relations, with no oversight or 
intermediation from external state functionaries. The most well-connected individuals rely on 
power derived from kinship networks in their clash over access to water. Others were 
ghettoised into a system where no immediate legal or administrative action may be brought 
against the powerful.  
It should be noted here that relations between the local people and social courts are 
ambiguous and dynamic. Social courts operate in the twilight between state and society, 
using a combination of formal and customary law. Similarly, elders are part of a complex 
network of informal alliances both within and outside the kebele administration. This fluid 
socio-political field of intermediaries provide residents with choices and opportunity in 
negotiating water rights and exercise their agency. It also, however, means that the elders 
have to work to consolidate their positions of prominence with the local people by offering 
services of mediation, while simultaneously maintaining their alliances with powerful and 
wealthy individuals. Such realities impact on the agency of the poor and women creating 
opportunities for negotiating in the complexities of local power relations as well as 
circumscribing their voice. 
Returning to local complaints, many people expressed their frustrations related to canal 
maintenance. Although it is the responsibility of the WUA to mobilise labour, it is usually 
individual peasants who clear debris from canals. My informants cited that wealthier farmers 
receive special attention from the WUA while their own demands go unanswered. For 
instance, a middle-aged farmer said: 
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When damage occurs in areas which affect the rich, we all participate in the repair 
process. The association pays special attention to the demands of the rich. Sometimes 
they call government people [engineers] to clear the canals using graders. But when I 
and many other [whose land is located on heads of the watercourse] need help to carry 
water uphill, no one responds.91 
Similarly, another young peasant complained:  
When we need [technical] help from the government, we should submit an application 
in writing on a piece of paper to the association. The association treats an application 
from a rich man and myself differently. They make sure the rich get help from the 
government. We [whose land is uphill] are still pleading with the WUA for canal 
clearance.92  
Here, my informants are referring to the established institutional procedure of requesting 
technical help from the government where technical assistance can only be requested through 
the WUA (which is assumed to represent the interests of the local community). However, in 
practice, as my informants indicated, such requests from poor members are often ignored, 
leaving them to their own devices. 
In almost every case from the informants above and in my interviews with many other 
farmers, those who expressed their complaints and frustrations found that they were unfairly 
treated by local elites, not by mengist. As one elderly man said: ‘it is our own children [local 
elites] who make us suffer.’ These comments from different informants reveal that boundary-
making practices have locked poor people and women into livelihoods that are not 
empowering. Ironically, far from benefitting from the irrigation scheme, the peasants might, 
in fact, become worse off by ceding 20 per cent of their landholding for canal construction.  
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To summarise, the participatory aspect of the scheme aimed at community self-
management and self-empowerment had the contradictory effect of sustaining class 
differences partly because of the unrealistic assumption of the existence of community as a 
harmonious whole that is separate from the state. The assumption that the project can be 
equitably managed through the WUA has ‘depoliticised’ local practices of abuse, not 
because, as Ferguson93 argued in the case of Lesotho, of the technical aspects of the project, 
but rather because it has become ghettoised and incarcerated as a community issue. 
Ultimately, as we have seen, the fruits of the project have failed to reach the poor.  
Conclusion 
This article has examined the complex development practices and processes in the KIWM to 
substantiate three aspects of state-society dynamics in Ethiopia. First it has shown that the 
distinction between state and society arises from complex, locally grounded practices of 
boundary-making and the production of difference. Second, the state-society boundary is in 
reality unclear, elusive and porous. This was demonstrated through the prism of various 
domains of project implementation: planning, design, construction, institutionalisation and 
usage pattern. In all these domains, the multiplicity of actors, their positionalities and 
overlapping relations points to the dynamism and permeability of the boundary between state 
and society. Finally, it has shown that the distinction between state and society was 
nevertheless perceived as a real boundary and has been acted upon.  
 
The thick description of the project also calls to attention the distinction between the 
rendition of the implementation of the community-based and -driven aspect of the project and 
its real life. The participatory approach of the scheme was spurred by the impulse to reach out 
and empower marginalised sections of local communities which should be allowed to have an 
equal say regarding their own development. However, the strategy of achieving this through 
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training had the paradoxical effect of informing the peasants what they are and what they lack 
for them to meaningfully participate.  
Community participation as a project of empowerment, when examined through the prism 
of an ethnography of state-society relations, is precarious. If we take the experiences, 
struggles and subjectivities of rural people seriously, then we need also to question the 
significance of community-based and driven projects as a means to empower rural people and 
create self-reliant communities. Projects such as KIWM, instead of producing self- 
empowered communities, further entrench the centrality of the idea of an autonomous state in 
rural people’s imagination and lives and reproduce and reaffirm the line between state and 
society. This has significant material consequences in terms of farmers’ access to water and 
land resources and technical assistance. My contention is that regardless of whether the state 
is imagined as being benign or authoritarian, whether it is legitimate or not, or whether it is 
contested or negotiated, it remains significant in the lives of rural people; that they do not 
wish it away or seek to reduce the level of its involvement. 
Overall the study demonstrated the importance of the state idea and also how the 
contingent nature of the state-society boundary that characterises rural Ethiopia shapes the 
working of the state. Such empirically grounded ethnographic research of the state that takes 
into account both processes and practices of development administration helps to frame our 
understanding of state-society relations.  
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